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I. Introduction
When the land that is now the United States and Canada was settled by Europeans, its
former inhabitants were displaced, often leaving behind skeletal remains and evidence of
their art and culture. Such artifacts have become part of our collective history and have
allowed scientists and historians to discover much about human migration patterns, the tra-
ditions of native peoples, and even the origins of humankind itself. U.S. social and political
understanding has gradually evolved from the eighteenth-century belief that the artifacts and
burial grounds excavated on American soil were disconnected from the Native Americans
of that day.' Through further archaeological and anthropological study, Americans have
grown to understand and appreciate the rich tradition and culture of Native American
peoples-their spirituality, their resourcefulness, their environmental wisdom. But scien-
tific and anthropological curiosity, Congress has decided, are not excuses for the atrocities
visited upon the cultural property of Native American peoples and the remains of their
ancestors.
Legislation in recent decades, such as the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) passed in 1990, has required the return of some of these arti-
facts to indigenous peoples, for burial or for preservation in keeping with their traditions or
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wishes.' Significant litigation has resulted,3 and recent proposed amendments to NAGPRA
have led at least one commentator to suggest it could make archaeology and anthropology
in the United States so costly as to become impracticable. 4 While this may or may not be
overstating the problem, it is clear that some view NAGPRA as a threat to the acquisition
of knowledge, while others take the position that it does not go far enough in protecting
their dignity and that of their ancestors; much, as a result, is at stake. The key stakeholders,
who sometimes have competing spiritual, economic, cultural, scientific, legal, and human
interests, are tribes, museums and scientists. The key battlegrounds are courtrooms and
legislative chambers.
This Comment compares and contrasts the current applicable laws and precedents of
Canada and the United States pertaining to the repatriation of cultural artifacts of indig-
enous peoples. It evaluates the relative effectiveness and the impact of these laws, both on
indigenous peoples, for whom these objects are sacred or at least have cultural significance,
and on those who would use this cultural property to learn about the culture, traditions, and
origins of human ancestry. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to consider the func-
tion and impact of laws and disputes concerning the protection of the lands of indigenous
peoples or the preservation of their harvesting, hunting or fishing rights upon these or any
other lands. Likewise, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the breadth and impact
of export/import laws concerning cultural objects.
H. Historical and Theoretical Background
It has been suggested that at times the United States has been guilty of possessing "a short
cultural memory."' Partly, this is because political notions of Manifest Destiny and the birth
of a new nation required, as their basis, the belief that what the Europeans encountered
upon their arrival on the eastern shores of what is now the United States was "pristine
land," unencumbered, unpopulated and unused. 6 The U.S. government was presumed to
hold the tide in fee simple to all lands, whether occupied by Indians or not; what the Indians
held, at best, was a permissive right to perpetually occupy the land. Their right was posses-
sory in nature (not a property right) and inalienable unless such alienation was first autho-
rized by the federal government. The federal government, however, as well as anyone to
whom it conveyed title in fee simple, could oust the occupying Indians at any time.7
2. In the main, this legislation includes: the 1906 Antiquities Act, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33m (1988)), which was intended mainly to protect Native American remains, but
only as "archaeological resources" (see Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 25J. LAND
REsOURCES & ENVTL. L. 259, 264 (2005)); the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-470un
(1966); the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (1979); the National Museum of
the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q-80q-15 (1990); and the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990,25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (2005) [hereinafter NAGPRA].
3. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
4. The Peopling of the Americas: The Plot Thickens, Eco NoMIST, July 16, 2005, at 74.
5. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 E2d 278,
297 (7th Cir. 1990).
6. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United States,
78 B.U.L. Rev. 559, 560 (1995).
7. Deborah F Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, andApplicability of Native American Graves Protec-
tion and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1170), 173 A.L.R. Fed. 585, 598 (2005);
see also Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 339 (1945).
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Furthermore, this new land was land that, because of its virgin nature, was ripe with
promise and opportunity. Culture in this context, to the early settlers, was European.
The aboriginal peoples discovered here did not have "culture" in a European under-
standing of that term. They were thought to be inferior, mere savages. Thus, the cultural
memory of the United States, per se, would only extend back as far as its birth or, at most,
the early colonies. Even if culture could have been said to have existed in the land the
Europeans occupied prior to their arrival, the new arrivals would not have considered it
U.S. culture-at least not early in U.S. history.
A. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE
It is important to understand that "culture" is a loaded term and clearly means different
things to different people. To some, it is simply that which is "collected by a country's
museums and libraries," 9 while others view it in terms of its value in the marketplace.' 0
In its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO, a United Nations cultural
organization, defines culture very broadly as "the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intel-
lectual and emotional features of society or a social group," and notes that it is "at the heart
of contemporary debates about identity, social cohesion, and the development of a knowl-
edge-based economy."" One legal scholar describes culture as "the matrix into which we
are born ... the anvil upon which our persons and destinies are forged."'2 Anthropologists
and archaeologists tend to define culture in terms of what a society collectively creates,
values, and believes-the accumulated, learned, and shared traditions that represent the
collective identity of a society or community.'3
Culture, in other words, is "the very expression of our soul both individually and col-
lectively,"'1 4 and cultural objects, then, as embodiments of culture, are meaningless outside
the context of the society or community to which they belong. Culture in this sense is
perhaps best conceived as a set of behaviors, beliefs, traditions, and rituals that are created
by, learned by, and handed down from generation to generation within a group of people
who organize themselves into a more or less cohesive society. It stands the test of time. It is
symbolic and representative, yet not merely so, for it is somehow woven into the collective
identity of a people.
1. The Significance of Cultural Property
The treatment of cultural objects is therefore reflective of societal attitudes toward not
only the objects themselves, but also toward the culture they represent. People of a given
ethnographic community are known to develop strong emotional ties to various artifacts
and historical sites. Cultural property, more than most other forms of property, seems to
8. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 1, at 676.
9. Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 561.
10. Id.
11. U.N. Educ., Scientific, and Cultural Org. [U.N.E.S.C.O.], Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,
U.N.E.S.C.O., 31st Session, General Conference of U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris (Nov. 2, 2001), http://unesdoc
.unesco.org/images/0012/001271 / 127160m.pdf.
12. Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities of
Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 CAP. L. REv. 201, 204 (2005).
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be "bound up with the identity of its holder" and "particularly important to the owner's
self-development and fulfillment."1 6 This is one reason it is entitled to greater respect than
other forms of property. How a society regards various cultural objects also becomes "an
important measure of [its] own cultural identity."7 For instance, robbing a cultural object
of its context-taking it from the archaeological site where it was found, for example-
often means losing the opportunity to learn about various aspects of past societies, such as
religious rites, working habits, and familial relationships. Such information is "lost forever"
once an item is removed from its context." The theft and destruction of cultural property
has thus also been used as a means to oppress minorities or to assert the dominance of a new
regime over an old one. 9
For these reasons and others, global concern has grown over the past twenty or thirty
years "that the heritage of ... various cultures may become obliterated."20 The United
States came late to the wave of legislation passed in various countries that recognized that
"cultural treasures [were] in jeopardy, that many have been destroyed without consider-
ation of their values."2 The "understanding and appreciation of a nation's cultural origins
and heritage" are fundamental to the development of cultural maturity; it is how a nation's
citizens gain "wisdom and vision."2 But the statutes are necessarily limited; for instance,
NAGPRAs protections extend only to cultural objects held by federally funded muse-
ums and other federal agencies or found on federal or tribal land subsequent to the law's
enactment, and they do not extend to objects acquired "with the voluntary consent of an
individual or group that had authority of alienation."2 3
Given the now recognized central importance of cultural property, it becomes a question
as to how any society might come to feel comfortable with the private ownership of human
remains and other cultural property. One answer may be found in traditional Western theo-
ries of how ownership is acquired. Under libertarian theory, a person acquires property
because of the work or effort he or she put into creating it or improving it 2 4 Closely related
is personality theory, which suggests "one gains ownership of an external object by impos-
ing one's will upon it."2" Mary Jane Radin takes this a step further, noting that, under this
theory, the personal property is important "because its holder could not be the particular
person she is without it."16 Finally, utilitarian theory justifies private-party ownership by
way of the benefit derived to larger society from private ownership, as opposed to commu-
nal ownership. 7 Any one of these theories could be used to justify the private ownership of
cultural remains and other objects.
16. Tanya Evelyn George, Using Customary International Law to Identify "Fetishistic" Claims to Cultural
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1207, 1209 (2005).
17. Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 562.
18. Id. at 564.
19. Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destuction of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes Under
the Rome Statute of the ICC, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 857, 858 (2005).
20. Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEw ENG. L. Ra. 64, 64
(1993).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 107.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13).
24. Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 568.
25. Id.
26. MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 972 (1982).
27. Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 568.
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2. Whose Culture?
But when individuals within a larger society begin to take private ownership of ancient
objects and remains created by or culturally related to certain subgroups of people within
that society, does the larger society thereby expand its own cultural identity to include
that of the subgroups? This question wanders into issues of cultural autonomy, and its
answer depends largely on how cultural objects are treated and what level of respect they
are accorded. It would not seem, for example, that a larger society has expanded its own
cultural identity when the subculture it has embraced is one that has been misrepresented
and thus misappropriated. Cultural misrepresentation often occurs when cultural objects
are taken from the place of their discovery, especially when the people to whom the cultural
objects belong (or their descendents) have had little if any involvement in the process of
understanding and attaching meaning to the objects or the culture they represent.2
In the case of Native Americans, until perhaps very recently, museum curators were the
ones who determined which Native American cultural objects were important enough or rep-
resentative enough to display for the public, and what meaning should be attached to them.
Because Native Americans had no property rights in those objects until NAGPRA, they
were "unable to control the representation of those objects." 9 Such control is "vital to the
ability of these tribes to communicate their own cultural image." 0
Aside from NAGPRA itself, another example of this yielding of cultural control to the
rightful owners of the cultural property was the passage of the National Museum of the
American Indian Act. In passing this law Congress was responding "to the demands of
Native American activists for the return of their ancestors' remains and sacred objects."'"
Unlike NAGPRA, the Museum Act does apply to the Smithsonian Institution, but also cre-
ates a separate National Museum of the American Indian within the Smithsonian Institu-
tion. It is "the first national museum to exclusively focus on the cultures of various native
peoples" in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and South America.3 2
The real triumph of this statute for Native Americans is that it allows them a voice in
the representation of their own culture. The museum is required by law to consult "with
native people regarding the care of the museum's collections and the design of its exhibits
and facilities," and is also required to include Native Americans on the museum's board of
directors.3
There exist perhaps better examples in several of the provincial regulations in Canada.
Starting in 1996, British Columbia sought to "preserve, restore and enhance" the "heritage,
language and culture" of its First Nations inhabitants through the "sharing of knowledge"
both inside and outside of First Nations communities to celebrate "cultural diversity among
all British Columbians," thereby embracing First Nations culture as being as important as,
and indeed part of, British Columbian culture. 4 Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon
28. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, Contested Objects, Contested Meanings: Native American Grave Protection
Laws and the Interpretation of Culture, 335 U.C. DAVs L. Rev. 1261, 1270 (2002).
29. Id. at 1262.
30. Id. at 1264.
31. Id. at 1277,
32. Id. at 1278-79.
33. Id. at 1279.
34. First Peoples' Heritage, Language and Culture Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 147 (1996), amended by 2003
R.S.B.C., ch. 70, § 148.
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Territory each have similar statutes," and the Canadian legislature in 1985 enacted
a federal Canadian Multiculturalism Act that promises federal institutions will con-
duct themselves in a way that is "sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of
Canada.
3 6
B. SCIENCE VS. SPIRITUALITY
The dynamic that pushes recognition of the cultural significance of what, for so many
years, amounted to merely scientific property is the value placed on religious freedom
under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. To the extent that NAGPRA recog-
nizes Native American people as having a unique culture and to the extent it protects their
human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony, the statute has
been lauded by some as an important step in the protection of the religious freedoms of
Native American people. It is at the very least a recognition that Native Americans' religious
freedom, after centuries of neglect and abuse, is "particularly in need of special protection
by the laws of the United States government."37 Even so, such supporters find NAGPRA
unfortunately unequal to the task, "underinclusive in its application ... [because] [n]on-
federal institutions such as art auction houses, dealers and private collectors are not bound
by the Act."" Indeed, it is very probably legally impossible for NAGPRA to extend to such
institutions, many of which "contain some form of Native American religious property." 9
But if NAGPRA were really intended to protect the religious freedoms and spiritual
beliefs of native peoples, one might expect U.S. courts to give the religious beliefs of native
peoples more deference when interpreting the Act. The courts so far have not taken a very
expansive view of that aspect of the legislative intent behind the Act. Even the Hawaii
federal district court could not accomplish this in its very sensitive and almost apologetic
decision in Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton.4° Attorneys for the Native Hawaiian
organization Hui Malama, which ultimately was adjudged to have standing in this repatria-
tion case, initially argued for the remains they wished to repatriate to have standing-for
the remains themselves to be plaintiffs in the case, through Hui Malama only as their
guardian-because, "according to Hawaiian custom, human remains are spiritual beings
that possess all of the traits of a living person."4' The court struggled with the concept, cit-
ing several cases in which non-human living things were granted standing in U.S. courts,42
and citing a U.S. Supreme Court dissenting opinion that argued for the grant of standing
to a river, as surrogate for the interest of the living things that call it home. 43
35. Manitoba Multiculturalism Act, S.M., ch. 56 (1992); Multiculturalism Act, S.S., ch. M-23.01 (1997);
Human Rights Act, R.S.Y., ch. 116 (2002).
36. Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C., ch. 24, § 3(2) (1985, 4th Supp.), amended by 2002 R.S.C.,
ch. 7, § 129.
37. Suzanne Milchan, Whose Rights Are These Anyway?-A Rethinking of Our Society's Intellectual Property
Laws in Order to Better Protect Native American Religious Property, 28 Am. INDiAN L. Rav. 157, 168 (2003/2004).
38. Id. at 169 (quoting Kristin Ann Mattiske, Recognition of Indigenous Heritage in the Modern World: U.S.
Legal Protection in Light of International Custom, 27 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 1105, 1131 (2002)).
39. Milchan, supra note 37, at 169.
40. Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 E Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995).
41. Id. at 1406.
42. Id. at 1407 (citing Palila v. Hawaii DLNR, 852 E2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cit. 1988)); Mount Graham Red
Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 E2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991); Sun Enters., Ltd. v. Crane, 532 E2d 280 (2d Cit. 1976)).
43. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). It is perhaps the
most poetic example employed by the court in Dalton and it is worth excerpting here:
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Ultimately, however, the court, while clearly respecting the personal beliefs of the
litigants, held that the remains could not meet common law standing because there was
no evidence they had suffered injury. Even here, the Native Hawaiians had asserted that,
because the remains were spiritual beings with all the traits of living persons, the "physical
examination of the remains was.., a violation and desecration" that resulted in the remains
suffering an injury.44 For Native Hawaiians, the "[p]rotection of one's ancestor's bones ... is
of great importance." 4" But again, the court could not accommodate the Native Hawaiians'
spiritual beliefs within the rigid confines of Western law, and, in a footnote, the court noted
"its discomfort with applying the conventional concept of 'injury' in an area of such deeply-
held [sic] belief."4
Critics of NAGPRA also claim to have a First Amendment argument. Some legal scholars
have claimed that scientists have a "right of scientific inquiry" stemming from the context
in which the First Amendment was ratified. It is argued that the Founders, "writing during
the Enlightenment era's emphatic support of science, undoubtedly recognized the impor-
tance of a constitutional right of scientific inquiry and intended the First Amendment's
freedom of expression to include scientific research and experimentation." 4 While U.S.
district courts and circuit courts of appeal have protected the dissemination of informa-
tion gleaned from scientific research, 4 as well as scientific inquiry itself, as "academic
labor" under a recognized First Amendment protection for academic freedom,49 the U.S.
Supreme Court has never explicitly extended First Amendment protection to scientific
inquiry, per se. 0
Even if such constitutional protection exists, many Native Americans are deeply offended
by much of what scientists do in studying their remains. Particularly offensive are scientists'
attempts to trace ancient tribal migration patterns. To do so, scientists often employ DNA
The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects,
water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all the other animals, including man, who are dependant
on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological
unit of life that is part of it.
44. Id. at 1406.
45. MatthewJ. Petrich, Litigating NAGPRA in Hawai'i: Dignity or Deback?, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 545, 545 (2000).
46. Dalton, 894 F Supp. at 1407 n.8.
47. Michelle Hibbert, Comment, Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, and the FirstAmendment, 23 Am. INoDLA L. REv. 425,442-43 (1998/1999) (citing Natasha C. Lis-
man, Freedom of Scientific Research: A Frontier Isue in FirstAmendment Law, BosToN BJ., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 4).
48. See, e.g., Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F Supp. 472,473 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that "the First Amend-
ment protects scientific expression and debate just as it protects political and artistic expression"); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 E Supp. 990, 991-92 (D.C. Wis. 1979) (applying a First Amendment analysis to an
injunction on the dissemination of highly technical scientific information).
49. See, e.g., McMillan v. Togus Reg'l Office, 294 E Supp. 2d 305, 317-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that
"[s]cientists should not have to conduct their studies defensively, looking over their shoulders at unnecessary
costly litigations"); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 E2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that "whatever
constitutional protection is afforded by the First Amendment extends as readily to the scholar in the laboratory
as to the teacher in the classroom").
50. However, in determining what materials might qualify as "obscene" in Roth v. United States, the Court
did probe letters of the Continental Congress searching for the Founders' intention behind passage of the
First Amendment freedoms, and found that the reasons were many-among them, "the advancement of
truth, science, morality, and arts in general." 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (emphasis added) (citing a letter of the
Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec, I Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774)).
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analysis. Tissues analyzed in this way are destroyed; thus reducing what Native Americans
might be able to repatriate."' Furthermore, Native Americans find the identification of
tribal migration patterns offensive and discriminatory from a spiritual standpoint. They
have their own "genesis stories, which do not include tribal migration but most often spir-
its rising from the earth."52 They thus have perhaps little use for what science has to say
in this regard, raising questions about the value of such scientific inquiry relative to the
religious freedoms of Native American peoples, also protected by the First Amendment.
C. AccoUNTABILITY AND DIGNITY
It was differences like these-spiritual, cultural, and otherwise-that seemed to lay
a foundation for the misunderstandings and hostilities that so often and for so many years
defined the interaction of early European settlers and indigenous peoples. Europeans were
used to making deals and agreements with kingdoms and empires; the nomadic, clannish
existence of the native peoples was a completely foreign concept. In fact, "most groups now
recognized as tribes or nations developed those identities [only after and] often as
a result of contact with the invaders."53 European hierarchy was just as foreign to indigenous
peoples; native peoples had no elections, and relied on social pressures (rather than govern-
ment interference) to maintain social order and obedience. Because of religious differences,
native peoples seemed to take a much more reverent approach to nature, as all things in nature
were possessed of spiritual significance and power; indeed, in many indigenous traditions,
sacred objects themselves are considered to be living beings.54 The one considered a successful
person in indigenous communities was often the one who gave away much of he had to those
who had little, rather than the one who accumulated much wealth and lived in prosperity
while his neighbor starved. Finally, technological difference may have been very intimidating.
Many coastal indigenous communities had boats, "but they rarely ventured beyond the sight
of land"; Europeans' ships, on the other hand, were like "miniature movable communities.""
The clash of cultures resulted in Europeans gaining the upper hand in key areas, such as
agreements, which were written down (and perhaps often altered when they were formally
recorded) and written in the Europeans' language. The Europeans' advanced technology
also meant that often they had the advantage on the battlefield of "[g]unpowder, metal
weapons, and body armor." 6 The native people's bows and arrows, and wooden and stone
implements must have seemed almost medieval to the Europeans, and almost certainly
inferior. In many cases, native peoples were merely obstacles to overcome in colonizing the
new land and taking advantage of the wealth of opportunities it offered." This could partly
explain (though certainly never excuse) the atrocities subsequently visited on indigenous
peoples for decades thereafter.
During the conquest in the United States, "it is estimated that between seventy-four and
ninety-four million Native Americans were killed," wiping out, either by war or by disease,
51. Hibbert, supra note 47, at 433.
52. Id. at 433-34.
53. ROGER L. NICHOLS, INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1 (1998).
54. Barbara J. Winter, New Futures for the Past: Cooperation Between First Nations and Museums in Canada, 29
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. RE. 29, 30 (1995).
55. Nichols, supra note 53, at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3.
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about ninety-eight percent of the Native American population. 8 Add to this injury the insult
of treaty violations and burial-site desecration. The cultural property and human remains
of Native Americans have "uniquely suffered from being the object of a very significant
market for thieves and vandals." 9 As of 1990, the Smithsonian Institute was in possession
of about 18,500 Native American skeletons, the Tennessee Valley Authority around 10,000,
and estimates of the number "in museums and private collections ranged from 100,000 up
to two million." 60 Much of this was the result of an order issued by Surgeon General J.K.
Barnes in 1868, instructing "all Army field officers to send him Indian skeletons ... so
that studies could be performed to determine whether the Indian was inferior to the white
man ... [and] to show that the Indian was not capable of being a landowner."' 6'
Beyond U.S. military theft of Native American remains, the U.S. government has too
often turned a blind eye to the black market in cultural property and cultural intellectual
property. House floor debates prior to the passage of NAGPRA cite a National Geographic
article detailing "the desecration of over 650 native American [sic] graves ... in Kentucky.
Graves were unearthed, funerary objects sold and bones of the dead were left strewn about
the farm." 62 Furthermore, the scientific community-particularly in biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals-has explored "indigenous folklore and identity ... for their commercial
value," making use of their human tissue "to discover drugs and suitable genetic resources
for genetic engineering." 63 What consistently seems to be missing is the strong presence of
(and respect for) a Native American perspective on the value and nature of Native American
culture and spirituality.
All of this sets the stage for a contentious relationship between native peoples and the
U.S. government, despite recent progress toward understanding and accommodation on
the government's part. This contentious relationship effectively stymies most attempts at
negotiation, and adversarial litigation is often the result. Perspective on the issues arising in
this litigation may be obtained through consideration of not only NAGPRA and its inter-
pretation, but also, briefly, interpretation of what came before NAGPRA.
HI. The U.S. Approach
The wary posture of native peoples toward the U.S. government is in no small mea-
sure due to the government's unfortunately consistent approach to their situation and their
concerns. The federal approach to the protection of cultural property has been influenced
heavily by the history of genocide detailed above, by treaty violations, by ignorance, and
by a politically motivated belief, for so many years, that the native peoples were inferior to
the Europeans who conquered them. Discussion of U.S. law in the Congressional Record
is still indexed under "Indians," a misnomer that can be traced back to Columbus's mistaken
58. Yasaitis, supra note 2, at 260. Compare this to the approximately six million Jews (and others)
murdered during the Nazi Holocaust. See Holocaust Survivors' Network, Referenced Research: The Camps,
http://isurvived.org/Frameset4References/-NaziCamps.html (last visited March 21, 2006).
59. Buckman, supra note 7, at 594.
60. Id. at 595 (citing Jack E Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARz. ST. LJ. 35, 39 (1992)).
61. 136 Cong. Rec. 31937 (1990) (statement of Rep. Campbell).
62. 136 Cong. Rec. 31940 (1990) (statement of Rep. Bennett) (citing generally Harvey Arden & Steve Wall,
Who Owns Our Past?, 175 NAT'L GEOGRAPHiC 376 (1989)).
63. Martine de Koning, Biodiversity Prospecting and the Equitable Remuneration of Ethnobiological Knowledge:
Reconciling Industry and Indigenous Interests, 12 INTELL. Prop. J. 261, 262-63 (1997).
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impression that he had sailed all the way around the world to the East Indies when he
landed on the eastern shores of the Americas and the Caribbean."
A. NAGPRA AND ITS PREDECESSORS
Prior to 1990, protection for Native American cultural objects in the United States
existed mostly with regard to the rights of archaeologists and other scholars and scientists.
Often they were protected only as objects of scientific inquiry, not as sacred objects with
a family history and a tribal tradition. The focus of the Archaeological Resources Protec-
tion Act (ARPA), for example, is accurately revealed by its title.
1. Pre-NAGPRA Legislation
In the United States, federal attention first turned to the remains of Native American
peoples in 1906, with passage of the Antiquities Act amid concern over the looting of
archaeological sites and a growing national interest in Southwest American Indian culture.61
This first piece of legislation was very limited and was focused primarily on historical pres-
ervation of monuments and other historical sites. However, it represented the early steps
toward recognition of the value of cultural resources and objects, as it established "a per-
mitting system for the excavation and gathering of "objects of antiquity' on federal lands
designated as 'National Monuments." '66 These permits are generally issued to institutions,
such as museums and universities, rather than to individuals.
A series of subsequent statutes further solidified the nation's historical preservation
program, culminating with passage of ARPA in 1979.67 ARPA is designed to protect
archaeological resources on federal and tribal lands and "to foster increased cooperation
and exchange of information between governmental authorities, the professional archaeo-
logical community, and private individuals having collections of archaeological resources
and data." 6 Under ARPA, excavation and removal of archaeological resources from a site
require a permit, which is issued "only for research purposes," and any artifacts removed
from the site are to "remain the property of the United States." 69
One other statute of note is the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), passed in
1966. Designed to protect archaeological resources from the actions of the federal govern-
ment, NHPA requires the Secretary of the Interior to "assist Indian tribes in preserving
their particular historic properties" and to "foster communication and cooperation between
Indian tribes and State Historic Preservation Officers... to ensure that all types of historic
properties and all public interests in such properties are given due consideration."' 0 Again,
the focus here is on the historical resources themselves as trappings of U.S. culture, not on
the rights of indigenous peoples, nor even on their interests in protecting their own culture;
Native American values are to be "taken into account to the extent feasible."7'
64. An English translation of the letter sent by Columbus upon discovery of what he took to be the Indies is
available at http://www.usm.maine.edu/-maps/columbus/transation.htnml (Feb. 9, 1998).
65. Gerstenblith, supra note 1, at 676.
66. Julia H. Miller, A Layperson's Guide to Historic Preservation Law: A Survey of Federal, State, and Local Laws
Governing Historic Resource Protection, SLO14 ALI-ABA 1, 19 (Preservation Books, 2005).
67. Phelan, supra note 20, at 64-65.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1979).
69. Miller, supra note 66, at 18-19.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(l)(A).
71. Id. § 470a(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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2. NAGPRA-Its Purpose and Provisions
When Congress finally passed NAGPRA in 1990, it was primarily to address new
archaeological standards of ethics, which had changed in response to the Civil Rights
Movement in the United States and the "rise of global activity on behalf of indigenous
populations in other countries."" Sen. Daniel Inouye noted at NAGPRAs passage in the
Senate that it was only the remains of Native Americans, and not those of white soldiers,
that were displayed in the nation's museums. This sends a message, he said, "to the rest of
the world ... that Indians are culturally and physically different from and inferior to non-
Indians."" The Society of Professional Archaeologists developed a Code of Ethics in 1981
that stated, in part, that "it is clear that the rights of those being studied take precedence
over the rights of [archaeologists] who study them,"7 4 but archaeologists didn't begin to take
account of Native American perspectives in their work until after the Society for American
Archaeology promulgated its own Principles of Archaeological Ethics in 1996.21
NAGPRA aims both to protect ownership rights of Native Americans to "cultural items
that are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990,76
and also to return to appropriate tribes those cultural items currently in the hands of "Fed-
eral agencies and museums." The statute specifically exempts the Smithsonian Institution
from its requirements. Putting some additional teeth into NAGPRA is 18 U.S.C. § 1170,
which criminally penalizes "trafficking in Native American human remains and cultural
items."7 9 The idea is not only to restore remains and other funerary objects to the posses-
sion of modem tribes, but also to prevent future theft of cultural objects and violation of
sacred burial sites.
Except in certain limited circumstances, NAGPRA prohibits the intentional excavation
of human remains and other Native American cultural objects on federal or tribal lands.8 0
Inadvertent discovery of such material is to be reported immediately to the Secretary of the
Interior or the appropriate Indian tribe if the discovery was made on tribal land.8 ' Whether
the discovery is intentional or accidental, the remains and the cultural objects are controlled
by the lineal descendants or, when these cannot be ascertained, the tribe associated with
the land on which the discovery was made. 2 In instances where remains or objects are
discovered in the course of activities associated with construction, mining, logging, and so
forth, the activity is to be halted and cannot resume "until certified as safe to the discovered
remains." 3
72. Yasaitis, supra note 2, at 263.
73. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 60, at 59 (citing 136 CONG. RPc. S17174-75 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Inouye)).
74. Yasaitis, supra note 2, at 263 (quoting Anthony L. Klesert & Shirley Powell, A Perspective on Ethics and the
Reburial Controversy, 58 AM. ANriQurrY 585, 589 (1990)).
75. Id.
76. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a).
77. Id. § 300 5(a).
78. Id. §§ 3001(4), (8). However, around the time of NAGPRAs passage, the Smithsonian had just become
covered by the National Museum of the American Indian Act, passed in 1989 and serving many of the same
purposes as NAGPRA in terms of consultation and repatriation.
79. Buckman, supra note 7, at 585.
80. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c).
81. Id. § 3002(d)(1).
82. Id. § 300 2 (a).
83. Buckman, supra note 7, at 596; see also 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d)(1).
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B. COURT INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
Because early legislation was focused on the property rights of scientists and museums,
so too were the interpretations of early court decisions. ARPA, for instance, was passed in
1979 in response to the danger looters represented to the nation's archaeological resources.
When an individual is caught looting or having looted or having paid someone else to steal
resources from a site, that individual is subject to fines and prison time, and the stolen goods
are forfeited "to the United States," not to the Native Americans from whose traditional
lands the artifacts were stolen or to whose ancestors they belonged. s4 The United States
owns the objects because they were removed from federal land. Therefore, the "ultimate
disposition" of the stolen property is determined by regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, "subject to the consent of the Indian or Indian tribe which owns or has
jurisdiction over" the lands from which the resources were taken.8" However, "Congress'
plenary power to extinguish Indian ownership (with compensation), [and] the substantial
[Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)] role in regulating the excavation and removal of archaeo-
logical resources on Indian land by non-Indians" indicate that such historic property is
under the BIAs control.8 6 No reported decisions have interpreted this particular provision
of ARPA.
Instead of addressing individuals' violations of Indian lands and property, NHPA attempts
to limit the effects of the actions of federal agencies on such lands. Section 470(h) of the
Act details the "professional standards" to be followed by federal agencies in protecting his-
toric and archaeological resources, which include encouraging land owners to consult with
interested Native American parties "prior to excavating or disposing of a Native American
cultural item."8" This section of the NHPA has not been specifically litigated in reported
decisions.
The statute most resembling NAGPRA prior to its passage was the National Museum
of the American Indian Act (NMAIA), which applies only to the Smithsonian.88 Aside from
NAGPRA, it is really "the only legislation to deal effectively with both the protection and
repatriation of Native American human remains and cultural objects."8 9 The repatriation
provisions of this Act have not been interpreted in any reported cases either.
1. Court Interpretations of NAGPRA's Provisions and Constitutionality
In the nearly sixteen years since NAGPRAs passage, fewer than twenty decisions have
interpreted its provisions. To date, eighteen court opinions, none of them handed down by
the U.S. Supreme Court, have been issued regarding NAGPRA and its provisions-eleven
84. Roberto Iraola, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act-Twenty Five Years Later, 42 Duq. L. Rev. 221,
226-27 (2004) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b)(1)).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 470dd.
86. H. Barry Holt, Comment, Archaeological Preservation on Indian Lands: Conflicts and Dilemmas in Applying
the National Historic Preservation Act, 15 ENVTL. L. 413, 433 (1985).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-4(b)(4)(D).
88. Recall that NAGPRA specifically excludes the Smithsonian Institution from being subject to its
provisions. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
89. Yasaitis, supra note 2, at 265. At first dealing only with human remains and objects interred with
them, the NMAIA was amended in 1996 to apply also to "sacred objects and objects of cultural patrimony,"
borrowing from the language of NAGPRA. Id.
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circuit court of appeals opinions9° and seven district court opinions." Some courts have
provided guidance in the interpretation of the various provisions within NAGPRA, while
others have merely defended its constitutionality.
So far, the courts have determined that NAGPRA is constitutional, in spite of claims
that it is vague and overbroad -9 2 or that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. 93 The issue
of vagueness has been raised mostly by those charged with criminal acts under the statute,
arguing that the term "cultural patrimony" is too subjective to be clear. Cultural patrimony
is a "cultural item" protected under the Act, and is defined as "an object having ongoing his-
torical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture
itself,"94 such that it is inalienable and cannot be owned or conveyed by an individual, whether
of Native American ancestry or not. While acknowledging conflicting Native American opin-
ions as to whether particular "ceremonial adornments" were considered cultural patrimony,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless held the term sufficiently defined in the
statute.9" With regard to Equal Protection, the Federal District Court for the District of
Oregon held that Congress has a "special obligation" to protect and benefit Native Americans
with legislation because, as the court put it, there is no "significant market in cultural objects
and remains stolen from predominantly Caucasian graveyards in the United States."96
Other disputes have arisen over standing, damages, evidence of ancestry, and whether the
Act conflicts with the Freedom of Information Act. Mostly the litigants involve indigenous
peoples suing the federal government for repatriation of remains they claim to be those of
their ancestors. However, at least one case has involved indigenous peoples as both plaintiff
and defendant.97 In Na Lei ANi Kawananakoa v. Hui Malama I Na Kupuna 0 Hawaii Nei,
Native Hawaiian groups sued a nonprofit Native Hawaiian organization to undo the repa-
triation of several funerary objects, returning them to the museum from which they had
been repatriated under NAGPRA. 9' But the most interesting and controversial issues tend
to involve standing and the use of oral history as evidence of a tribal connection to a given
set of human remains or sacred objects.
90. Na Lei Alii Kawananakoa v. Hui Malama I Na Kupuna 0 Hawaii Nei, 158 E App'x 53 (9th Cir.
2005); San Carlos Apache Tree v. United States, No. 03-16874, 2005 WL 1903556 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2005);
Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004); Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Brownlee, 331 F.3d
912 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F3d 349 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tidwell,
191 E3d 976(9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Corrow,
119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997); Monet v. United States, 114 F3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Monet v. Hawaii, 113
E3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997); Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1996).
91. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (D.S.D. 2003); W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation
of N.Y. v. New York, 100 £ Supp. 2d 122 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46
E Supp. 2d 644 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Idrogo v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1998); Monet v. Lee,
No.94-00884HG, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17300(D. Haw. Oct. 30,1995);NalwiONaKupunaOMokapuv. Dalton,
894 . Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995); Abenaki Nation of Mississquoi v. Hughes, 805 E Supp. 234 (D. Vt. 1992).
92. United States v. Tidwell, 191 F3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Corrow, 119 F3d 796 (10th Cir.
1997).
93. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
94. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D).
95. Corrow, 119 F3d at 801-803.
96. Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 628, 649 (D. Or. 1997).
97. Na Lei Alii Kawananakoa v. Hui Malama I Na Kupuna 0 Hawaii Nei, 15$ F App'x 53 (9th Cir. 2005).
98. Id. at 54. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case held it was not an abuse of discretion for the
District Court of Hawaii to have issued a preliminary injunction, forcing the nonprofit organization to return
the funerary objects to the museum, while it was determined whether an abuse of NAGPRA had occurred.
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Perhaps the most intriguing opinions regarding standing were handed down in the
Dalton, Idrogo v. United States, and Bonnicbsen v. United States cases. As discussed above,
the Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii in Dalton rejected Native Hawaiians'
spiritual argument that human remains themselves are "spiritual beings that possess all the
traits of a living person." 99 For the remains to have standing, living human beings would
have to realize some benefit from the grant of standing to the remains. The Native Hawai-
ians' argument in this case, however, "reveals one of the problematic differences between
what federal courts and Native Americans see as an injury in fact."' °
The Idrogo decision was less about injury in fact and more about proof of ancestral or
cultural connection. The case, brought by both an individual (named Idrogo) and a group
called Americans for the Repatriation of Geronimo, involved an effort to repatriate the
remains of Geronimo or else to grant him full military honors. Because Geronimo's life
ended while he was a prisoner of war, his remains were located at the U.S. Army's Fort
Sill in Oklahoma.' 0 The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia decided both
parties' connections with Geronimo were too tenuous. The Americans for the Repatriation
of Geronimo did not even pretend to be a tribe or even an "organized group or commu-
nity of Indians," as required under NAGPRA.' 2 Rather, the group simply purported to
be "a group of concerned Americans who are eligible voters and residents of the various
states of the United States."' 3 If plaintiff Michael Idrogo could have proved an ancestral
connection to Geronimo, he would have had standing. However, Idrogo never claimed to
be a member of a tribe either, saying only that he believed Geronimo to be an ancestor of
his, based solely on the facts that both Geronimo and Idrogo could speak Spanish and both
were approximately the same height.0 4
Another important development regarding standing surrounds the discovery of prehis-
toric remains. By their nature, such remains predate recorded history. What if such remains
are discovered on lands occupied or formerly occupied by a modern Native American
tribe? Are the tribe's traditions and stories of permanence in the region enough to establish
a connection to the remains? Would it be a connection strong enough to trigger application
of NAGPRA? This was the central issue in the Bonnichsen case, discussed more fully below
because of its scientific and political impact.
Closely related to issues of standing are problems with the use of oral history as evidence
in the courtroom. Normally, oral history-in this case, stories of one's ancestry or tribal
traditions, passed on from one generation to the next only by word of mouth-would be
considered hearsay.'05 However, NAGPRA itself calls for the use of "geographical, kinship,
biological, archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical,
or other relevant information or expert opinion" in determining the cultural affiliation
of human remains and funerary objects.106 To date, reported opinions show no evidence
99. Dalton, 894 E Supp. at 1406; see supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
100. Yasaitis, supra note 2, at 273.
101. Idrogo, 18 E Supp. 2d at26.
102. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(7).
103. Idrogo, 18 F Supp. 2d at 27.
104. Id. at 27.
105. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
FED. R. EvID. 80 1(c).
106. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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of courts specifically trying to reconcile NAGPRAs requirements with the Federal Rules of
Evidence. However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon did weigh evidence
provided by oral tradition in the Bonnicbsen case, which dealt with prehistoric remains esti-
mated to be perhaps more than 9,000 years old. The Secretary of the Interior had earlier
examined the testimony of experts with regard to the oral-tradition evidence and had con-
cluded that the tribe's oral histories put it in the location in question, and "lacked any refer-
ence to migration into or out of that area." 07 However, the court called reliance on oral
history "highly problematic" in a case involving prehistoric remains. 0 The court took note
of the "hundreds of intermediaries" that must have taken part in relaying this oral history,
and held that when events are ancient,
... we cannot know who first told a narrative, or the circumstances, or the identity of the
intervening links in the chain, or whether the narrative has been altered, intentionally or
otherwise, over time. The opportunity for error increases when information is relayed
through multiple persons over time. Intervening changes in language may alter meanings,
as might the process of translation into other languages. 9
The court seemed to restrict its comments to ancient events, but it must be noted that the
same arguments could be made against the use of oral history collected over almost any
span of time. Again, this case is discussed more fully below.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has grappled with oral history in the
context of state law provisions. In Castro Romero v. Becken, the Fifth Circuit was asked to
recognize specified land as a cemetery, protected under Texas statutory provisions, so that it
could not be used as the site of a future golf course."0 Castro Romero testified that the oral
history of the tribe from which he descended established that the specified land was used as
a burial ground for his people. Without commenting on the relative value of oral history or
its usefulness as evidence, the court simply dismissed the argument, saying Castro Romero
had not alleged the various individual components of the statutory definition of a cemetery
under Texas law-including that the land had been "publicly dedicated as a cemetery" and
had been "enclosed for use as a cemetery" and had not been abandoned."'
It is worth noting here that the courts in Canada have also struggled with whether to
admit oral history as evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada, while reluctant to admit oral
history as evidence for a very long time, has recently adopted a sui generis classification of
aboriginal rights to property."2 The sui generis classification could be interpreted to mean
that the Canadian rules of evidence must be modified in cases involving aboriginal claims
and oral histories. In R. v. Van der Peet, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts with
aboriginal claims before them must recognize that any rights the aboriginal peoples have
will have originated in a time when "there were no written records of the practices, customs
and traditions engaged in," and that they "must not undervalue the evidence presented
107. Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1152 (D. Or. 2002).
108. Id. at 1152.
109. Id. at 1152-53.
110. Castro Romero, 256 F.3d at 352.
111. Id. at 355.
112. The Supreme Court of Canada extended this sui generis classification in Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R.
335; see Russell Binch, 'Speaking for Themselves': Historical Determinism and Cultural Relativity in Sui Generis
Aboriginaland Treaty Rights Litigation, 13 NAT'LJ. CONST. L. 245, 247 (2002).
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by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not conform precisely with the
evidentiary standards that would be applied in... a private law torts case."".
2. Recent Developments: Bonnichsen v. United States and Its Backlash
Perhaps the most controversial reported case in NAGPRA adjudication, Bonnichsen v.
United States,"' has caused quite a stir in political, scientific, and museum circles, as well
as among indigenous communities. The case involves remains discovered on federal lands
in the state of Washington, under the control of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The
remains, found near the shore of the Columbia River outside Kennewick, Washington, by a
group of teenagers on their way to a boat race, were unusual because of their estimated age.
The bones, which came to be known as "Kennewick Man," were removed from the site at
the request of the county coroner for analysis by an anthropologist." 5
Unable to say with certainty just how old the remains were, the anthropologist, using
radiocarbon dating, estimated the skeleton was somewhere between 8,340 and 9,200 years
old, dating further back than any existing Indian tribe is known to have existed on the lands
currently belonging to the United States-in fact, "a time predating all recorded history
from any place in the world,... a time so ancient that the pristine and untouched land and
the primitive cultures that may have lived on it are not deeply understood by even the most
well-informed men and women of our age."'"6 Arrangements were made to bring the find to
the Smithsonian's National Museum of Natural History for closer examination." 7
Nevertheless, four local tribes reasoned the remains, being ancient, must be those of one
of their ancestors. Collectively they thus filed a claim for control under NAGPRA, hop-
ing to retrieve the remains from the scientists and give them a proper burial in accordance
with their traditions. The Corps of Engineers agreed with the tribes and seized the remains
before they could be transported to the Smithsonian."'
However, the scientists who had possession of the nearly complete skeleton, supported
in their efforts by the Smithsonian Institution, protested that Kennewick Man's features
were quite unlike those of the modern tribes that claimed him as an ancestor, that his
features were more European than American Indian or Mongolian, and that further study
was required to discover more about "the origins of humanity in the Americas"" 9-- the pos-
sibility of the presence of humans on the continent prior to the arrival American Indians on
what is now U.S. soil or, at least, the possibility of the presence of humans other than the
ancestors of modem Native American tribes.
The real issue in this case was whether NAGPRA was applicable or not. If so, the remains
must go to the tribes for burial; if not, Kennewick Man would be returned to the scientists
for further study. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that NAGPRA did not apply
113. Binch, s-upra note 112, at 250 (quoting R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 n.12 at para. 68).
114. Bonnicksen, 367 E3d at 864.
115. This decision proved devastating to further study later. Scientists attempting to determine when
Kennewick Man lived wanted to look at the sediment layers where the remains were found; they were unable
to because the Corps of Engineers decided to bury the discovery site in April 1998, under "two million pounds
of rubble and dirt, topped with 3700 [sic] willow, dogwood, and cottonwood plants." Bonnichsen, 367 E3d at
871 n.10.
116. Bonnichsen, 367 E3d at 868.
117. Id. at 869-70.
118. Id. at 870.
119. Id.
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in this case. 20 The court took a very literal reading of the statute's definition of "Native
American." Under NAGPRA, ownership and control of recently discovered Native Ameri-
can remains is only vested in the decedent's lineal descendants or, if they cannot be ascer-
tained, then in a tribe affiliated with the remains.'
The key question here was whether these remains were even Native American at all.
NAGPRA defines a "Native American" as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture
that is indigenous to the United States.'' 2 2 The court believed it important that this defini-
tion was written in the present tense; i.e., "the statute unambiguously requires that human
remains bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture to be consid-
ered Native American.
" 123
The court justified its strict construction by noting that part of the purpose of NAGPRA
was to "protect the dignity of the human body after death by ensuring that Native Ameri-
can graves and remains be treated with respect.' 2 4 Further, the court said NAGPRA was
not intended to "give Native American status to any remains found with the United States
regardless of age and regardless of lack of connection to existing indigenous tribes."'25
The decision has caused an uproar in both academic and non-academic circles. One
legal scholar argued that the fact that NAGPRA is remedial legislation and that it is Native
American law must bear on its interpretation, that deference should be given in such cases
to the agency charged with enforcement and interpretation of the statute.' 26 In the case of
Kennewick Man, this would have meant initially deferring to the judgment of the Army
Corps of Engineers, which the district court claimed made a snap decision, without collect-
ing all the evidence necessary to make that decision.'2 7
On the other side of the debate, The Economist published an article in July 2005 predict-
ing the demise of paleoanthropology itself in the United States if such litigation cannot be
settled more quickly and less expensively, or if an opposite conclusion might be necessitated
by NAGPRA amendments proposed in the U.S. Senate. 2 " On March 7, 2005, Sen. John
McCain introduced the Native American Omnibus Act of 2005, which contains amend-
ments to a number of statutory provisions relating to Native Americans, including NAG-
PRA. 12 9 Section 108 of the bill amends the definition of Native American used in NAGPRA
by adding "or was" after "is. ' 110
The amendment seems directed at the Bonnichsen decision, though the case was not spe-
cifically mentioned-neither during Sen. McCain's introduction of the bill to Congress,'
nor in the report submitted by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, which favorably
recommended the bill on March 9, 2005.132 The report merely notes "[t]his change is
120. Id. at 882.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(B).
122. Id. § 3001(9).
123. Bonnicbsen, 367 E3d at 875.
124. Id. at 876.
125. Id.
126. Will R. Ripley, Note, You're Not Native American-You're Too Old: Bonnichsen v. United States Exposes
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 9J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 137, 148-49 (2005).
127. Bonnichsen, 367 E3d at 871.
128. The Peopling of the Americas, supra note 4, at 74.
129. S. 536, 109th Congress § 108 (2005).
130. Id.
131. CONG. REC. S2152-53 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).
132. S. REP. No. 109-67, at Cong. Rec. S5070 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (submitted by Sen. McCain).
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intended to clarify that in the context of repatriations, the term 'Native American' refers to
a member of a tribe, a people, or a culture that is or was indigenous to the United States."'33
However, President George W Bush's administration has apparently voiced its disapproval
of McCain's proposed amendment.'34
C. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS
The irony, of course, as one scholar notes, is that the indigenous community is clashing
with the scientific community on this issue, since anthropologists, archaeologists, and other
scientists "have probably done more to preserve a record of Native American cultures than
any other entity in American society.""'3 But while scientists may do much to further our
knowledge of Native American culture, they also offend that very culture through some
of the processes they use to discern it, including DNA testing to trace migratory patterns
and so forth. While U.S. laws have been passed out of respect for the culture and heritage
of Native Americans and to make reparations for unspeakable atrocities European ances-
tors visited upon native peoples, at its heart, U.S. law still seems to lack a certain requisite
respect for Native American spirituality and the Native American perspective.
For example, while the United States has done well to prevent the trafficking in cultural
objects by imposing serious import restrictions, it has yet to enact any export restrictions,
leading to the impression that the United States government doesn't believe there is any
U.S. cultural property worth protecting; i.e., that the cultural artifacts of Native Americans
are not worth protecting. In fact, it has been suggested that, court interpretations aside,
NAGPRA itself is not infused with much evidence of respect for indigenous peoples. Call-
ing "the assumption that Western law can play a significant role in the resolution of issues
of cultural respect and dignity" an obstacle to the implementation of NAGPRA in Hawaii,
Matthew Petrich has suggested there is too much contrast between traditional Hawaiian
methods of dispute resolution and the process of litigation created by NAGPRA.'3 Petrich
argues that "[w]hile the process of litigation may serve to vindicate Anglo-American sensi-
bilities," the United States instead needs a process that "'makes sense' to the culture whose
dignity is at stake."'37
Negotiation is a process that has a great deal more in common with the dispute resolution
processes with which many native peoples are familiar. Perhaps that is one advantage of the
Canadian approach. Ironically, it was through lengthy negotiations with Native American
leaders that the principles underlying the NMAIA were hammered out.'38
WV The Canadian Approach
While discussions in Canada regarding the reburial of ancient remains have not been
without contention, the First Nations communities of Canada "have a reputation for
133. Id.
134. Allison M. Dussias, Kennewick Man, Kinship, and the "Dying Race": The Ninth Circuit's Assimilationist
Assault on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 84 NEB. L. RFv. 55, 161 (2005) (citing
"Bush Administration Opposes NAGPRA Amendment," http://www.indianz.com/News/2005/009562.asp
(last visited Aug. 5, 2005)).
135. Michael J. Kelly, A Skeleton in the Legal Closet: The Discovery of "Kennewick Man" Crystalizes the Debate
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being much more interested in involvement and in benefitting [sic] from Western
scientific analyses of their ancestors' remains" than have Native Americans. 3 9 However,
efforts are frustrated in Canada by the lack of a national law or policy regarding repatriation
of indigenous human skeletal remains and cultural objects.' Canadian regulations are
mostly provincial in nature, when they exist at all; the remaining void is filled by volun-
tary repatriation policies created by museums and research institutions, as well as "ethical
mandates of national professional organizations such as the Canadian Archaeological
Association and the Canadian Museums Association."
14 1
A. PROVINCIAL REGULATIONS
The first province to enact legislation related to the cultural property of indigenous peo-
ples was British Columbia, which passed the Historic Objects Preservation Act in 1925.142
Like early legislation in the United States, this act was merely designed to protect "petro-
gylphs [sic], pictographs and totem poles as 'art. ""141 Since then, Alberta, British Columbia,
and the Yukon Territory have all established provincial and territorial relationships with
indigenous peoples in their respective regions, and promulgated regulations grappling with
the repatriation of human remains and cultural objects of aboriginal ancestry.'4 Other
provinces and the Canadian Parliament have passed regulations recognizing the impor-
tance of indigenous languages and culture. 41
Of the three provincial and territorial statutes dealing with remains and cultural objects,
Alberta's is perhaps most similar to the United States' NAGPRA. Alberta's First Nations
Sacred Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act grants to indigenous peoples the right to
apply for the return of sacred ceremonial objects currently in the possession of government
entities. The eventual return of the objects is at the discretion of an appropriate govern-
ment official.' 46 Additionally, the "sacred ceremonial objects" must be "vital to the practice
of [a] First Nation's sacred ceremonial traditions, '4 implying the object must be currently
useful to a currently existing tribe or nation. There are echoes here of the controversial
interpretation given to NAGPRA in Bonnichsen. But most profoundly, unlike NAGPRA,
Alberta's statute is silent with regard to human remains and silent with regard to any new
sacred ceremonial objects found since passage of the law, as repatriation is defined by the
statute as the transfer of objects specifically from the Crown to a First Nation.
139. Ryan M. Seidemann, Bones of Contention: A Comparative Eramination of Law Governing Human Remains
from Archaeological Contexts in Formerly Colonial Countries, 64 La. L. Rev. 545, 574 (2004); see also
Brian E. Spurling & Ernest G. Walker, The Fort Qu'Appelle Burial Site: A Canadian Controvery, featured in
Hester A. Davis, Public Ar haeology Forum, 14J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 481, 484 (1987).
140. Seidemann, supra note 139, at 575-76 (citing Gary Baikie, What Do the Labrador Inuit Want?, 8 INUIT
ARTQ. 8, 12 (1993)).
141. Seidemann, supra note 139, at 575.
142. Winter, supra note 54, at 31 (citing S.B.C., ch.17 (1925)).
143. Id.
144. First Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, R.S.A., ch. F-14 (2000); Heritage
Conservation Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 187 (1996) (amended by 2004 R.S.B.C., ch. 66, § 53); Historic Resources Act,
R.S.Y., ch. 109 (2002).
145. Seesupra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
146. R.S.A., ch. F-14, § 2(2) (2000).
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British Columbia's Heritage Conservation Act is aimed more broadly at encouraging
and facilitating "the protection and conservation of heritage property" in the province. 4
As part of its provisions, it prohibits the removal of remains and heritage objects from offi-
cial designated heritage sites or burial places. 49 Under the statute, archaeologists require
a special permit to excavate any land to search for "artifacts of aboriginal origin," 50 and
museums may apply for outright ownership of heritage objects-but not of objects that
have "cultural heritage value to an aboriginal people."'' Still, the definition of aboriginal
peoples qualified under the statute seems to imply an element of currency. They are people
"sharing a common traditional territory and having a common traditional language, culture
and laws." '52 And far from creating special accommodations for the interests of First Nation
peoples, the statute appears to put all other communities within British Columbia on equal
footing with aboriginal communities.5 3 An interesting feature of the British Columbia stat-
ute, though, is its direct appeal to negotiation and relationship building between the prov-
ince itself and the people of First Nations, providing explicitly for the Province to "enter
into formal agreement with a first nation with respect to the conservation and protection
of heritage sites and heritage objects that represent the cultural heritage of the aboriginal




In fact, British Columbia did enter into a formal agreement with the Nisga'a First
Nation, which has established communities primarily in the northern parts of the prov-
ince. The Nisga'a Final Agreement of 1998 returns to the Nisga'a about "2000 square
[kilometers] of land, establishes a system of Nisga'a self-government and provides for
hunting and fishing rights," in addition to dealing with cultural objects.' With respect
to cultural objects, the Canadian Museum of Civilization and the Royal British Columbia
Museum agreed to return certain specified portions of their Nisga'a collections, roughly
twenty-five percent and forty percent, respectively. A similar agreement was hammered
out between Newfoundland and Labrador and the Inuit First Nation. This agreement,
Chapter 15 of which addresses archaeological artifacts, burial sites and human remains, and
other "cultural materials,"' 5 6 was signed by the parties in 2004, and ratified by the House
of Commons in the summer of 2005; it is awaiting ratification by the Senate.5 7 As part of
the agreement, the Canadian government will, at the Inuit peoples' request, "facilitate ...
access to Archaeological Materials and Inuit Cultural Materials ... that are held in public
148. R.S.B.C., ch. 187, § 2 (1996).
149. Id. § 13(2)(b).
150. Id. § 14(1).
151. Id. § 19(6).
152. Id. § 1.
153. Id.
154. R.S.B.C., ch. 187, § 4(1).
155. Robert K Paterson, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights for the 21st Century:
Claiming Possession of the Material Cultural Property of Indigenous Peoples, 16 CONN.J. INT'L L. 283, 291 (2001).
156. Land Claims Agreement Between the Inuit of Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Newfoundland and Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Chapter 15, initialed on May 10,
1999, available at http://www.laa.gov.nl.caIlaa/claimsaipIliaaip.htm [hereinafter Inuit Land Claims].
157. Labrador Inuit Agreement Sails Smoothly Through Commons, CBC NEws, June 16, 2005, http://www.cbc
.ca/north/story/inuit-labrador- 16062005.html.
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and private collections."'5 8 It will also contribute five million Canadian dollars "to assist in
the preservation and development of Inuit heritage and Inuit heritage resources."
5 9
The Yukon Territory seems to have the most expansive of the provincial and territorial
statutes in its Historic Resources Act. Under this statute, objects of value to archaeologists,
ethnographers, paleontologists, or other scientists may not be excavated for or removed
from the Territory, except under a properly issued "historic resources permit."'" This
seems to favor scientific endeavor, or at least to protect the objects of indigenous peoples
only insofar as they are useful to scientific exploration or research. However, the statute also
restricts issuance of historic-resources permits, allowing the Minister to issue them only
with the consent of the governing body of a Yukon First Nation that governs a settlement
on which an historic object has been found. 16'
B. THE PROSPECT OF NATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN CANADA
Several scholars have called for the promulgation of Canadian federal legislation to pro-
tect cultural objects and ancient remains. In fact, the Canadian Minister of Communica-
tion in 1990 had drafted legislation similar to NAGPRA, but providing for "consultations
with Aboriginal cultural and religious groups in the case of newly discovered objects" and
providing for "the conclusion of agreements with Aboriginal peoples for ownership and
control of archaeological resources." 62 However, the draft never became law.
There is currently so much uncertainty surrounding the repatriation of remains and
artifacts in Canada that it is difficult for aboriginal communities to deal effectively with
disputes with the scientific community when they do arise. 163 While national legislation is
not necessarily the only way to cope with the problem, the dearth of national legislation and
the promulgation of provincial and territorial regulation in only two of Canada's provinces
and one of its territories has led to a heavy reliance on negotiation between Canadian gov-
ernmental entities and various indigenous tribes.
Negotiation, as a means to repatriation, has enormous potential in Canada. Indeed, a
1992 Task Force on Museums and First Peoples concluded-even after examining the
United States' NAGPRA legislation-that, because of the diversity of both First Nations
peoples and museums, an overarching national legislative fix to the problem was inadvis-
able. Instead, recognizing both the value of cultural objects in the nation's museum col-
lections and the value of First Nations peoples' perspectives and interpretation of such
objects, the Task Force recommended a more collaborative effort, one favoring negotiation
to litigation. The following is from the Task Force Report:
There is wide recognition that concepts of ownership vary, [sic] therefore, a case-by-case
collaborative approach to resolving repatriation based on moral and ethical criteria is
favoured rather than a strictly legalistic approach. The "Native American Grave [sic] Pro-
tection and Repatriation Act", [sic] recently passed in the United States, was studied by Task
Force members. While not ruling out the possibility of the creation of legislation in the
158. Inuit Land Claims, supra note 156, at ch. 15.2.6.
159. Id. atch. 15.2.7.
160. R.S.Y., ch. 109, §§ 62-63 (2002).
161. Id. § 65(2).
162. Paterson, supra note 155, at 291.
163. Spurling & Walker, supra note 139, at 481, 485.
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future, it was agreed that it was preferable to encourage museums and Aboriginal peoples
to work collaboratively to resolve issues concerning the management, care and custody of
cultural objects. 64
The overwhelming benefit of negotiation, of course, is that there is the opportunity for
both parties to emerge from the encounter content with the outcome, having been mutually
benefited. However, the Task Force and the Canadian Museums Association left would-be
negotiators without much direction or assistance in implementing its recommendations.1
65
Specific guidelines within the report tow a very hard line with regard to human remains,
suggesting that "[t]he retention of Aboriginal human remains for prolonged periods against
the expressed wishes of First Peoples is not acceptable.' 1 66 And the report did try to assist
the repatriation of sacred and ceremonial objects with creative solutions, such as sharing
objects on a loan basis or allowing for replication of certain items. 67
While the Task Force focused its recommendations on repatriation, it also suggested
involvement of the perspectives of First Nations peoples in the creation of museum exhi-
bitions. This portion of the Task Force's work appears to have had the most widespread
impact. Even just two years after the Task Force released its report, there was increased
involvement of aboriginal peoples in consulting and advisory capacities with museums,
and "[e]xhibits presented wholly from a First Nations perspective, or including a First
Nations perspective as an alternative voice, are becoming the expectation rather than the
exception." '
Although negotiation has been employed somewhat effectively in Canada, one drawback
appears to be that negotiation's usefulness in repatriating cultural objects is largely limited
to circumstances in which those objects repatriated are "incidental to the negotiation of
comprehensive land claims agreements."' 69 Examples include the Nisga'a Final Agreement
and the Labrador-Inuit Land Claims Agreement discussed above. In fact, these two agree-
ments are illustrative of how much such agreements will vary from place to place. The
Nisga'a Final Agreement involved two very specific museums and included appendices that
listed exactly which items were to be repatriated. The Labrador-Inuit Land Claims Agree-
ment, on the other hand, involved a much more general commitment of government assis-
tance in repatriating items from both private and public museums. 170
C. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS
The Canadian government's relationship with its indigenous peoples, especially at the
provincial and territorial levels, seems especially productive and mutually respectful. Indig-
enous peoples in Canada seem more willing, and perhaps even eager in some cases, to
164. ASSEMBLY OF FIRST NATIONS & CANADIAN MUSEUMS ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON MUSEUMS AND FIRST
PEOPLES, TURNING THE PAGE: FORGING NEW PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN MUSEUMS AND FIRST PEOPLES § M11(E)
(1992), excerpts available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sia6a-e.html [hereinafter Task Force].
165. Trudy Nicks, The Task Force an Museums and First Peoples, U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 143, 144 (1995).
166. Task Force, supra note 164, at § 1II(H)(IV)(B)(3)(a)(vi).
167. Id. § III(H)(IV)(B)(3)(b)(iii)-(iv).
168. Nicks, supra note 165, at 145.
169. Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A Contextual Approach, 63
U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2005).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 155-159.
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work with scientists to protect their cultural objects, to become educated about their own
past, and to help non-indigenous people in Canada to better understand indigenous culture
and history. This has led to the growth of negotiation and regulation at the provincial and
territorial levels, but has effectively prevented the development of much national cohesion
in this regard.
Courts can always assist with national cohesion on legal issues, and the Supreme Court of
Canada has begun the process of creating cohesion with regard to the admissibility of oral
histories as evidence of aboriginal property rights. Granting aboriginal claims sui generis
status, the Court has moved in the direction of sensitivity to the aboriginal perspective in
this regard. The approach appears rooted in the recognition that aboriginal rights predate
written record, thus to require written record from them as evidence unfairly forecloses the
realization of their claims of right.
V. Comparative Analysis and Conclusion
The United States may have come late to the global conversation regarding the preserva-
tion of the cultural property of indigenous peoples, but it has the advantage of a national
policy and a federal regulation. The U.S. approach has been criticized for being too defer-
ential to science and for not taking Native American oral histories into account as evidence
in a court of law. On the other hand, new Senate amendments, if passed, may begin to swing
the balance in the other direction. Still, it is unclear what it will take for U.S. courts to
accept oral history as evidence or how the evidentiary challenges might be overcome.
While it is true that Canada lacks a national cohesiveness in its approach, still it seems to
have more flexibility in embracing its indigenous peoples and the value of their perspectives
and contributions to the process of determining ownership and control. Canadian courts
more readily accept oral history into evidence, though it is often still received with some
amount of skepticism, or at least caution. In addition, indigenous communities in Canada
seem more willing to work with, and more interested in working with, scientists and muse-
ums to preserve their culture and give their own traditions and perspectives the widest
possible dissemination-in the interests of science and education. It's simply a different
relationship, possibly born of a very different history.
One scholar has suggested the differences in approach may have created the cultural
attitudes and relationships among the various parties in each society, rather than the other
way around-that scholars and museum curators in the United States tend to "resent and
passively resist" repatriation "because of the imposition of compromise legislation, designed
to fit all circumstances but often proving to be inappropriate" (referring to NAGPRA). 7'
Canada's reliance on negotiation and voluntary agreements on an ad hoc basis, on the other
hand, possibly engenders a more cooperative atmosphere, in which "[h]uman remains have
not proven such a contentious issue" and where "most institutions follow the Task Force
recommendations and return such material on request."'72
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Whatever the explanation, it appears the respective approaches of the United States and
Canada to determining the ownership and control of cultural property and ancient remains
have both advantages and disadvantages. Each country has something to learn from the
other. And both countries probably still have much to learn from the traditions, beliefs, and
perspectives of their indigenous communities.
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